Afghanistan’s diplomatic rehabilitation is advancing faster than its accountability for terrorism. Russia sees an opportunity to contain Islamic State Khorasan and deny the US a renewed strategic foothold. Pakistan sees militant networks retaining the space to organise attacks across its border.
The gap between these priorities exposes the central weakness in regional engagement with the Taliban: Kabul is gaining legitimacy without delivering security to its neighbours.
Russia’s approach centres on Islamic State Khorasan, commonly called IS-K, and the possibility of renewed American strategic access. Pakistan confronts threats involving the TTP, the Baloch Liberation Army, Al-Qaeda and associated networks. These priorities overlap, but action against IS-K cannot become a substitute for addressing organisations attacking Pakistan.
Moscow’s concerns are understandable. The March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack showed the Islamic State threat’s reach. Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban government in July 2025, after lifting its domestic ban on the movement. Its engagement reflects an assessment that Afghanistan’s rulers can help contain a common enemy.
That calculation has a fundamental weakness. The Taliban can fight an organisation threatening their rule while sheltering and sponsoring others attacking neighbouring countries. Hostility towards IS-K establishes neither a comprehensive counterterrorism policy nor a commitment to protecting Pakistan.
Geopolitical competition reinforces this selective approach. At the October 2025 Moscow Format consultations, regional participants opposed foreign military infrastructure in Afghanistan and neighbouring states. The declaration followed US President Donald Trump’s expressed interest in recovering Bagram airbase. Pakistan also participated, demonstrating that opposition to renewed foreign basing can coexist with differences over Taliban conduct.
Moscow’s posture suggests that denying Washington another strategic foothold is an important consideration. The danger arises when keeping America out becomes more urgent than compelling Kabul to dismantle terrorist infrastructure. Pakistan cannot be expected to absorb the security costs of another power’s geopolitical calculations.
UN findings illustrate the problem. The sanctions Monitoring Team’s August 2026 report described continued Taliban support for the TTP alongside escalating attacks against Pakistan. It also recorded Taliban operations that weakened IS-K capabilities, while IS-K attacks declined inside Afghanistan and increased in Pakistan. Security within Afghanistan, therefore, offered no assurance of regional safety.
The report recorded a member state’s assessment that BLA members trained alongside the TTP under Al-Qaeda trainers in Afghanistan. Another reported shared logistical facilitation networks between IS-K and the BLA. These attributed assessments require investigation. They also demonstrate why different ideologies should not obscure the possibility of shared infrastructure. Afghanistan’s finances expose another contradiction in the narrative of an isolated regime surviving independently. According to the World Bank, domestic revenue reached 272.4 billion afghani, approximately $4.03 billion, in FY2025. This represented 19.8% of GDP and a 12.7% increase over FY 2024. Domestic tax revenue contributed 109.1 billion afghani and customs revenue 69.6 billion afghani. The Taliban possess substantial collection capacity, even within a fragile economy.
Yet improved revenue collection has not delivered external self-sufficiency. The World Bank’s February 2026 Economic Monitor recorded exports of approximately $1.7 billion over the first eleven months of FY2025 and a merchandise trade deficit of $10.4 billion. These figures imply imports of roughly $12.1 billion. The deficit was 18% larger than a year earlier, highlighting Afghanistan’s dependence on external resources.
Narcotics remain part of this economic picture. Reuters, reporting UNODC findings released on October 29, said opium cultivation expanded to an estimated 43,300 hectares in 2026, more than four times the previous year’s area. Opium sales generated an estimated $525 million. Processing, trafficking and overseas distribution generate additional value.
International assistance remains another major resource. The Kabul Institute’s aid tracker, using data through September 30, 2026, reported $8 billion in confirmed humanitarian payments since August 2021, $3.78 billion committed but unpaid, and $94 million pledged. Separately, it identified $12.04 billion in development finance commitments across 1,208 project records, with payment information unavailable in the sources examined.
Its donor breakdown listed $1.64 billion paid by the US, alongside $1.14 billion committed but unpaid. Recorded payments included $1.03 billion from Britain, $645.9 million from Germany, $602.5 million from the Asian Development Bank and $499 million from Japan.
Western governments remain financial stakeholders, while Russia pursues diplomatic influence and regional powers seek trade and security benefits. Kabul can engage these interests simultaneously. Recognition by Moscow has not removed Afghanistan’s reliance on international assistance or resolved its structural economic weaknesses.
Humanitarian support must continue reaching Afghan families. Poor disclosure warrants stronger monitoring. Diplomatic privileges and benefits accruing directly to Taliban authorities, however, should carry explicit obligations to prevent terrorism and disrupt illicit finance.
Those obligations must cover every organisation using Afghan territory to threaten neighbours. Kabul should prevent recruitment, close training facilities, disrupt financing and cooperate on identifiable suspects. Regional forums need deadlines and verification arrangements, supported by evidence Pakistan can share through protected channels.
Russia and its partners also have economic reasons to insist. The proposed Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway, TAPI pipeline and CASA-1000 electricity corridor require security throughout their routes. Connectivity cannot flourish while militant networks threaten workers and infrastructure.
Moscow can oppose an American military return while supporting firm action against the TTP, BLA and associated groups. Afghanistan’s revenues, external assistance and diplomatic access should support peaceful development and bring accountability. A settlement that protects Russian strategic interests while leaving Pakistan exposed will remain unstable, however warmly Kabul is received.
The writer is a public policy expert and leads the Country Partner Institute of the World Economic Forum in Pakistan. He tweets/posts @amirjahangir and can be reached at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
