The Democratic Party’s success in the US midterm elections should prompt Pakistan to reassess the foundations of its relationship with Washington.
US President Donald Trump remains in office until January 2029, and his administration will continue to exercise considerable influence over American foreign policy. However, the electoral setback for Republicans raises questions about the durability of arrangements negotiated through personal diplomacy. For Pakistan, which has enjoyed an unexpected revival of American attention under Trump, the implications deserve careful consideration.
Pakistan has benefited from unusually direct access to the White House. Acknowledgement of Trump’s mediating role in the May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire, despite India’s rejection of that characterisation, raised Pakistan’s diplomatic profile. Engagement between US and Pakistani civilian and military leaders has intensified. Trade negotiations have produced some tariff concessions, while discussions on critical minerals, energy and investment have created expectations of a broader economic relationship. Pakistan’s role in regional diplomacy, particularly involving Iran, has further enhanced its relevance to Washington.
These are meaningful developments. But diplomatic access, expressions of commercial interest and tangible economic benefits are not synonymous. The critical question is how much of the recent improvement rests on enduring American interests and how much depends on one president’s preferences.
Trump’s transactional approach has created opportunities for Pakistan. Unlike administrations that have viewed South Asia primarily through the prism of strategic competition with China, Trump has demonstrated a willingness to deal directly with Pakistan on issues where he perceives mutual advantage. His willingness to challenge India publicly has also altered the diplomatic atmosphere, although it would be premature to conclude that Washington’s longstanding strategic interest in India has fundamentally changed.
India remains a large market, an important technology partner and a significant element in American efforts to balance Chinese influence. These interests enjoy support across both American political parties. Pakistan should therefore avoid interpreting temporary diplomatic advantage as a permanent realignment of US priorities in South Asia.
The Democratic resurgence introduces other considerations. Congressional oversight of foreign policy, trade arrangements and investment commitments could become more assertive. Questions concerning democratic governance, civil liberties and the role of institutions in Pakistan may receive greater attention. Commercial agreements involving politically connected intermediaries could face scrutiny. None of this necessarily implies hostility towards Pakistan. It does suggest that personal relationships may no longer be sufficient to sustain the momentum of bilateral engagement.
Nor should Pakistan assume that Democrats and Republicans represent entirely different approaches to the region. American concerns about China, nuclear security, terrorism and regional stability have substantial bipartisan foundations. Differences are more likely to emerge in emphasis, diplomatic methods and the weight assigned to governance and human rights.
Pakistan’s immediate response should therefore be neither to distance itself from Trump nor to seek favour prematurely with his political opponents. It should be to broaden its engagement with the US beyond the presidency. Pakistan needs sustained attention on relationships with Congress, the State Department, the Treasury, the Commerce Department, American businesses, universities and policy institutions. A relationship that depends on access to the Oval Office is inherently vulnerable to electoral change.
More importantly, Pakistan must reconsider what it seeks from America. For decades, bilateral relations have been disproportionately shaped by security considerations. Pakistan’s strategic importance rose during the cold war, the Afghan conflict and the subsequent war on terrorism. It has risen again amid tensions involving India and Iran. Yet periods of heightened diplomatic relevance have seldom translated into sustained economic transformation.
The challenge is to convert renewed American interest into productive investment, exports, technology transfer and skills development. Pakistan should seek integration into American supply chains rather than rely on occasional concessions or politically negotiated projects.
Critical minerals provide a useful example. Pakistan possesses mineral resources that have attracted international interest. But exporting unprocessed ores would capture only a fraction of their potential economic value. Agreements should encourage commercially viable processing, refining, supporting infrastructure and technical capabilities. Equally, investment proposals in energy must be assessed against Pakistan’s existing generation capacity, transmission constraints and foreign exchange obligations. Attracting foreign investment is not an end in itself; its contribution to productivity, employment and external sustainability matters more.
This requires a change in Pakistan’s own approach to economic diplomacy. Investment announcements should not be confused with realised investment. Nor should the sale of domestic assets to foreign investors automatically be regarded as an economic success, particularly when the assets generate rupees, but future dividends require foreign exchange. Export-oriented investment, technology transfer and greater domestic value addition deserve priority.
Pakistan must also resist the temptation to view closer relations with Washington as requiring distance from Beijing. China remains an important partner in infrastructure, defence and economic cooperation. The Gulf countries are vital sources of remittances, investment and energy, while relations with Iran are shaped by geography and regional security. Pakistan’s interests are better served by diversified partnerships than exclusive alignment with any power.
Strategic autonomy, however, cannot be achieved by declaring an independent foreign policy alone. It requires the economic capacity to exercise meaningful choices. A country repeatedly dependent on external financing, constrained by a narrow export base and vulnerable to imported energy shocks has limited room to manoeuvre. Its diplomatic flexibility is inevitably influenced by the willingness of others to provide financial accommodation.
There is also an institutional dimension. Pakistan’s recent engagement with Washington has prominently involved military leadership. Security cooperation remains important, but an enduring economic relationship requires stronger participation by civilian institutions responsible for commerce, finance, investment and foreign affairs, together with the private sector. Economic diplomacy cannot remain subordinate to security diplomacy.
The American midterms should therefore be viewed as a warning against excessive dependence on personalities rather than a reason to abandon recent diplomatic gains. Pakistan has nearly two years to consolidate its relationship with the Trump administration while developing broader bipartisan and institutional relationships that can survive the next presidential transition.
Ultimately, the most effective response to changing political fortunes in Washington lies partly in Islamabad. Predictable taxation, competitive energy costs, improved governance, export diversification and credible investment policies would make Pakistan a more valuable economic partner regardless of who occupies the White House.
Pakistan has succeeded in reopening doors in Washington. Its next task is to ensure that those doors remain open when the personalities change. That requires converting diplomatic access into lasting economic relationships and recognising that the strongest foundation of foreign policy is economic strength at home.
The writer is a former CEO of Unilever Pakistan and of the Pakistan Business Council.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
