For the first time in seventy-eight years, the question being asked is: how should Pakistan be governed? For the past seventy-eight years, the question has been: who should govern Pakistan? For the past seventy-eight years, the question has been: who will drive the Pakistani car? Ayub asked it. Yahya asked it. Zia asked it. Musharraf asked it. Every answer changed the driver of the Pakistani car.
We tried a technocrat. We tried a populist. We tried a dynasty – twice. We tried a cricketer. Four templates. One result. Debt up from Rs3 billion in 1947 to Rs100 trillion. Rupee fell from Rs3.31 to a dollar in 1947 to Rs280 to a dollar. Circular debt rose from Rs145 billion in 2007 to Rs1.8 trillion.
Since independence: 4 governors-general; 13 presidents; 26 prime ministers. Red alert: Different drivers, same crash.
Looks like somebody in Rawalpindi did the math. The driver was never the problem. The car is the problem. Not just the driver. Now the transmission. Now the engine. Now the brakes. Hence the talk of new provinces. New provinces means new arithmetic. New arithmetic means a different centre of gravity.
The current move is from selecting rulers to redesigning rule. This is not a footnote. This is the biggest shift in civil-military calculus since 1958. Hence: constitutional amendments. Hence: hybrid arrangements formalised rather than merely practised. Hence: institutional architecture engineered to survive any single occupant of the Prime Minister’s House. This is systems-thinking applied to state power. Whether it succeeds is a separate question. That it is happening is not in dispute.
Now the second track. The Pakistan Army has done something never done before. Washington is talking to Rawalpindi. Riyadh is talking to Rawalpindi. Beijing has always talked to Rawalpindi. Centcom wants Pakistan. The Gulf wants Pakistani human resource and Pakistani mediation. The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.
In a region reshaped by Iran-Israel confrontation and US-China competition, the Pakistan Army has converted Pakistan’s geography into hard currency and made Pakistan strategically relevant like never before.
Call it what it is: One institution did that: the Pakistan Army.
Here is the failure: none of that relevance has been monetised. The army opened the door, and yet we are still standing in the doorway. This is the paradox of 2026 Pakistan: relevance without revenue. Leverage without liquidity. A seat at every table, and an empty plate at home.
Here is what should worry Rawalpindi more than any opposition rally. Every strategic window eventually closes. This window is open now. Riyadh is at the table. Washington is watching. Beijing is invested. Plain fact: The next eighteen months will decide whether 2026 becomes Pakistan’s best-monetised moment of strategic relevance or its most wasted one.
Pakistan does not have a strategic-relevance problem. Pakistan has a strategic-monetisation problem. Fix the car. Then ask what the car is actually for.
The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. He tweets/posts @saleemfarrukh and can be reached at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.
Originally published in The News
